Supreme Court Oral Arguments

• [23-1039] Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services

  Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2025. Petitioner: Marlean A. Ames.Respondent: Ohio Department of Youth Services. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioner) Ashley Robertson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) T. Elliot Gaiser (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Ohio Department of Youth Services hired Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, in 2004 and promoted her to Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) in 2014. In 2017, Ames was assigned a new supervisor, Ginine Trim, who is gay. Trim reported to Assistant Director Julie Walburn, and in 2019, Ryan Gies was appointed as the Department's Director. Both Walburn and Gies are heterosexual. In December 2018, Trim gave Ames a generally positive performance evaluation. In April 2019, Ames applied for the position of Bureau Chief of Quality but was not selected. Shortly after, Trim suggested that Ames consider retirement. On May 10, 2019, Ames was demoted from her PREA Administrator position, resulting in a significant pay cut. The Department then promoted Alexander Stojsavljevic, a 25-year-old gay man, to the PREA Administrator position. Later that year, Yolanda Frierson, a gay woman, was chosen as Bureau Chief of Quality. Following these events, Ames filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then sued the Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation and sex. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, holding that Ames lacked evidence of “background circumstances” necessary to establishing her prima facie case for her claim based on sexual orientation, and that Ames lacked evidence of pretext for purposes of her sex-discrimination claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a plaintiff who belongs to a majority group need to demonstrate “background circumstances suggesting that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

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• [23-7483] Esteras v. United States

  Esteras v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2025. Petitioner: Edgardo Esteras.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Christian J. Grostic (for the Petitioner) Masha G. Hansford (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In January 2020, Edgardo Esteras began a six-year term of supervised release following imprisonment for drug trafficking offenses. Three years into his supervised release, in January 2023, his probation officer reported violations including domestic violence and firearm possession, though the related criminal charges were dismissed at the victim's request. At a violation hearing, Judge Pearson found that Esteras had possessed a firearm while on supervised release. Concerned that previous sentences had failed to deter him, she imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release with special conditions including anger management and location monitoring. Though Esteras objected to the court’s consideration of certain statutory factors related to punishment, Judge Pearson maintained that she also weighed deterrence and public safety, while acknowledging that some supervision conditions had both punitive and rehabilitative aspects. On appeal, Esteras challenged his sentence on the ground that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question When revoking supervised release and imposing a prison sentence, may a district court consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—namely, “the seriousness of the offense,” “promot[ing] respect for the law,” and “just punishment”—even though these factors are not explicitly referenced in the supervised release statute?

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• [23-1324] Perttu v. Richards

  Perttu v. Richards Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2025. Petitioner: Thomas Perttu.Respondent: Kyle Brandon Richards. Advocates: Ann M. Sherman (for the Petitioner) Lori Alvino McGill (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Richards, an inmate at Michigan’s Baraga Correctional Facility, sued Resident Unit Manager Thomas Perttu for sexual harassment and retaliation. Richards alleged that Perttu destroyed multiple grievances he attempted to file regarding Perttu's sexual abuse. Additionally, Richards claimed Perttu threatened to kill him if he continued trying to file grievances and wrongfully placed him in administrative segregation. After Perttu moved for summary judgment arguing the inmates failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and Richards cross-moved raising constitutional claims, the district court denied both motions due to factual disputes. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and recommended finding that Perttu proved the inmates failed to exhaust remedies. The district court adopted this recommendation and dismissed the case. Richards appealed, and after requesting supplemental briefing on whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury for exhaustion disputes intertwined with case merits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that it does and reversed the judgment of the district court. Question In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

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• [23-7809] Gutierrez v. Saenz

  Gutierrez v. Saenz Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2025. Petitioner: Ruben Gutierrez.Respondent: Luis Saenz. Advocates: Anne E. Fisher (for the Petitioner) William F. Cole (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1998, Ruben Gutierrez was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the robbery and killing of Escolastica Harrison. After multiple appeals and habeas corpus petitions, Gutierrez sought DNA testing of evidence from the crime scene under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 64. Texas courts repeatedly denied his requests, in part because Chapter 64 does not authorize testing when exculpatory results might only affect punishment or sentencing. In 2019, Gutierrez filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cameron County District Attorney Luis V. Saenz and others challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures. Gutierrez argued that Chapter 64 improperly limited the rights granted in another Texas statute (Article 11.071) governing successive habeas applications for death row inmates. The district court agreed, ruling that the interaction between these laws violated procedural due process by making the right to bring a successive habeas application to claim innocence of the death penalty “illusory.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Gutierrez had no standing to make this claim and vacated the district court’s judgment. Question Does a Texas death-row inmate have standing to sue the state over its refusal to grant access to DNA testing under a law that allows such testing only when the person can demonstrate that exculpatory results would have prevented their conviction?

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• [23-1239] Barnes v. Felix

  Barnes v. Felix Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Janice Hughes Barnes.Respondent: Roberto Felix, Jr. Advocates: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Charles L. McCloud (for the Respondents) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, supporting Respondent Felix) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix Jr. fatally shot Ashtian Barnes during a traffic stop on the Harris County Tollway. After spotting Barnes’s Toyota Corolla, which had been flagged for toll violations, Felix initiated a stop and Barnes pulled over to the median. When Felix requested documentation, Barnes, who was driving a car rented in his girlfriend’s name, could not produce it and began “digging around” in the car. Claiming he smelled marijuana, Felix questioned Barnes, who then turned off the vehicle and suggested checking the trunk for documentation. Dash cam footage shows that after Barnes opened the trunk and exited the vehicle at Felix’s request, the car’s blinker came back on and the vehicle began to move. Felix, with his weapon drawn, stepped onto the moving car and pressed his gun against Barnes’s head. While holding onto the car frame with his head above the roof—leaving him unable to see inside the vehicle—Felix fired two shots. Barnes’s vehicle stopped, and he was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:57 p.m. Though both the Houston Police Department and Harris County Precinct 5 Constable's Office investigated the incident, a grand jury found no probable cause for an indictment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, focusing exclusively on the two seconds before the shooting when Barnes’s car began moving with Felix holding onto it. The court ruled that because Felix reasonably feared for his life in that moment, his use of deadly force was justified regardless of his previous actions, such as jumping onto the moving vehicle. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?

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